

989

~~TOP SECRET~~

HR70-14

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : [redacted] Report

1. Enclosed is a [redacted] report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword [redacted] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [redacted] is classified [redacted] and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted]

[redacted]


TS 788023
Copy # 10

[redacted]

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-2-

FIRDB-312/00080-78

Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
US Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center


TS 788023

Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8/2
94 PP




- 3 -



Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR, Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia



DATE OF INFO. 30 August 1977

DATE 23 January 1978


SUBJECT

Letter of Marshal KULIKOV to Polish Minister of National Defense Commenting on Exercise "ZAPAD [WEST]-77."

SOURCE Documentary

SUMMARY:

This report is a translation from Russian of a letter classified TOP SECRET from Marshal of the Soviet Union V. KULIKOV to W. JARUZELSKI, Polish Minister of National Defense, commenting on Exercise "ZAPAD [WEST]-77." The letter outlines mobilization, coordination, equipment, and preparation problems that became evident during the exercise and requests suggestions for resolving these problems. A Polish memorandum replying to the questions raised in this letter has been published




END OF SUMMARY

TS 788023
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



- 4 -

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE
MEMBER STATES OF THE
WARSAW PACT

TOP SECRET

30 August 1977

No. ShoVC [Headquarters Combined Armed Forces] /I/00900

Minister of National Defense
General of the Army W. JARUZELSKI


Dear Comrade Minister!

During the period 30 May through 9 June of the present year, ZAPAD [WEST]-77, an operational-strategic command-staff exercise of the armed forces of the member states of Warsaw Pact, was held on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, USSR, and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic under the direction of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade D. F. USTINOV. The participants in it were the General (Main) Staffs of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, Polish Armed Forces, Armed Forces of the USSR, and Czechoslovak People's Army; five front headquarters; three operations groups of the allied navies; 18 army headquarters of the different branches of the armed forces of the allied states; and civil defense organs.

TS 788023

Copy # 10


~~TOP SECRET~~



In scale and spatial scope the exercise was the largest one in recent years and had great military-political significance. Its main purpose, based on a comprehensive study of the possible make-up and nature of the enemy actions, of the status of the allied armies, and of the conditions of the theater of military operations, was to determine necessary measures for the further development of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in the coming years and to improve the practical skills of commanders and staffs in having the armed forces change over from a peacetime to a wartime status, in preparing operations and controlling troops, in maintaining close cooperation among the allied armies, as well as in providing for their comprehensive rear services support during the conduct of strategic operations.

The exercise was conducted in three stages: in the first stage, the following was accomplished: the preparation of the operation in the theater of military operations, the organization of the movement forward of the troops from the interior, the organization of the covering of the borders of the states, and the organization of the repulsing of the enemy invasion; in the second stage, the problems of repulsing the enemy invasion and of the movement forward to the theater of military operations of the second operational echelon fronts were worked out; in the third stage, the commitment to battle of second operational echelon fronts and going over to the employment of nuclear weapons were carried out. Problems of seizing a straits zone and of restoring the combat effectiveness of troops were also worked out.

TS 788023
Copy # 10



Handwritten: 2
C. 10/1/61

The Minister of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, while acting in the role of the directing body of the exercise, at the same time performed the function of the commander-in-chief of the troops in the theater of military operations and his staff. For this purpose an operations directorate, a directorate for playing out combat actions, and an umpire control directorate were set up in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This ensured that the exercise was conducted in conformity with the concept, made it possible to work out in actual practice a number of the problems of controlling a coalition grouping of armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states during a war in the theater of military operations, and also made it possible to play out the combat actions on a realistic time scale in accordance with the decisions of the commanders.


The thorough preparation of the staff of the directing body, of the umpires, and of the groups playing out the combat actions, which had been organized by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, played an important role in the instructiveness and organized conduct of the exercise. This preparation was done in close contact with the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, and the General Staffs of the Polish Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army. The personal participation in the preparation and conduct of the exercise of the ministers of national defense of the allied countries, General of the Army H. HOFFMANN, General of the Army W. JARUZELSKI, and General of the Army M. DZUR, made it possible, during the exercise, to work out a number of the major problems connected with having all the armed forces change over from a peacetime status to a wartime status.

TS 788023

Copy #

Handwritten: 10

~~TOP SECRET~~



- 7 -

In the estimation of the exercise director and in the general opinion of the ministers of defense, comrades HOFFMANN, JARUZELSKI, and DZUR, the exercise was interesting and of great benefit to those being trained. The method of conducting it has been approved, despite the fact that it demands great effort in the work of the directing body and participants. The playing out of the beginning of the war, of the enemy's preparation to deliver the first nuclear strike, and of the buildup of the retaliatory actions of the fronts was accomplished with particular instructiveness.


During the exercise the commanders of armies and fronts and the senior officers of the operations groups of the General (Main) Staffs showed that they were able to correctly resolve the tasks confronting them. They correctly understood the role, place, and missions of the armies, fronts, and General Staffs during the operational expansion and the conduct of a strategic operation in the theater of military operations. All of the staffs participating in the exercise were adequately trained and capable, in a short period of time, of planning operations and of controlling troops and naval forces.

The exercise also contributed to a further deepening of collaboration and the strengthening of combat camaraderie of the allied armies.

Together with its positive results, the exercise brought to light the need for the thorough analysis, refinement, and modification of certain basic aspects of the changeover of armed forces from a peacetime to a wartime status, of the technical equipping of allied armies, of the organization of troop control during a war, and of the operational training of commanders and staffs.

TS 788023
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~




We believe that in the near future it will be necessary to concentrate attention and our overall efforts on the practical resolution of the following problems that resulted from the experience of Exercise "ZAPAD-77."

The procedure for changeover of the armed forces from a peacetime to a wartime status. The experience accumulated in allied armies has revealed that existing levels of combat readiness do not, in full measure, enable them to react properly to NATO military preparations when there is an abrupt change in the military-political situation.

Measures carried out for increased readiness do not ensure that the troops are in a condition that would make it possible for them to immediately set about fulfilling combat tasks. Yet bringing them to full readiness might turn out to be premature. In this connection, in order to give greater orderliness and flexibility to the entire system of the changeover of the armed forces to a wartime status, a need has arisen to study the matter of introducing still another level of combat readiness, intermediate between increased combat readiness and full combat readiness. This, we believe, would make it possible to react more efficiently to the possible actions of the probable enemy in a prewar period.

The equipping of allied troops and navies with new models of armament and equipment. We consider that this fundamental problem for each national army requires the greatest attention so that each army continuously maintains technical superiority over the probable enemy. The accomplishment of this task will also support a significant increase in the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the allied armies, which corresponds with both the national and the international interests of the entire socialist commonwealth.

TS 788023
Copy # 10




The exercise confirmed with full clarity the necessity of immediately resolving questions of rearming allied troops and naval forces with new weapons systems. In particular, obsolete models of tanks, of tactical and operational-tactical missile launchers, of field artillery guns and antitank guided missiles, of surface-to-air missile systems, and of fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft need to be speedily replaced by new models having improved combat characteristics. There is a need for further development and enhancement of the technical equipping of the airfield network, for the preparation of highway sections for the takeoff and landing of combat aircraft, and for the stockpiling of reserves of materiel supplies and, first and foremost, of the various types of fuel and ammunition for new models of weapons.


There is also a need for the qualitative enhancement of the ship inventory and other forces of the allied fleets.

The organization of the control of coalition troop groupings in the theater of military operations. The exercise showed that the combat actions of formations of different branches of the armed forces of the allied states can be developed in a coordinated manner only if they are conducted according to a unified plan for the strategic operation in the theater and with control centralized in the hands of the commander-in-chief of the forces in the theater of military operations. By having a staff with means of control and communications and an array of support and servicing units, this organ can, in the event the situation worsens drastically, take over the command of the allied forces within the boundaries of the theater. The experience of the exercise has shown that the basis of the staff must already exist in peacetime so that in a period of threat it can be rapidly expanded to its full authorized strength.

TS 788023

Copy # 10






There is need for further improvement of the control over operational formations moving forward through the territory of allied states and over the regrouping of aviation, although by and large the General (main) staffs basically, correctly resolved the problems of control in the command-staff exercise that was conducted. In particular, it became clear that in order to accomplish the tasks of ensuring the forward movement of troops, of restoring disrupted transportation facilities, and of eliminating the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes, it would be advantageous to have, in allied countries in the forward movement zones of the fronts and armies, combined operations groups (or control centers) that are strong in numbers, equipped with means of communications and control, and headed by responsible representatives of the general staffs who have been given broad authority.

The experience of the work of the operations groups that have been sent out mutually by formations of differing national affiliation has shown that a number of the provisions of the existing "Guide on Operations Groups Being Sent Out to the Staffs of Formations and Large Units During Combined Actions of Allied Troops and Naval Forces" require refinement and supplementation. For example, the matter of incorporating operations groups provided with means of communication and control into the T/O&E of front and army staffs requires practical resolution, as does the matter of standard methods of training them.

The new system of operational level control posts (command post, alternate command post, rear control post), which provides better conditions for the organization and planning of operations as well as for troop control during combat actions, has proven itself worthwhile in all the allied armies. At the same time, the matter of the operations complement and communications means to be allocated to an alternate command post needs further research.

TS 788023

Copy # 10




Ensuring that the commander-in-chief in the theater of military operations and the front commanders have stable control over troops moving forward and conducting combat actions is inconceivable without linking the supporting military communications net that is being established in the theater of military operations with the state nets, without making use of satellite and tropospheric communications, and without introducing into all the allied armies a single system for the automated control of troops in a theater of military operations based on the "MANEVR" system developed for the operational-tactical level in the Soviet Army.

Further study is also required on the principles of allocating and manning of front field headquarters, and providing for their training and coordinated functioning while still at peace. For example, front field headquarters expanded on the basis of military district headquarters proved to be worthwhile. *

Maintenance of close cooperation among the organs controlling materiel-technical (rear services) support. The experience of the exercise showed that support for the allied army formations moving forward from the interior as well as for those conducting combat actions is structured, mainly, on a two-way basis with the assignment for this purpose of operations groups from the general staffs or the headquarters of the fronts. We consider it necessary, in order to coordinate the efforts and have cooperation of the rear services organs of the allied armies during an operation, to have a corresponding organ of control in the organization of the commander-in-chief of the troops in the theater of military operations. This organ must have the authority to resolve questions of shifting materiel reserves among the allied armies, to determine the priority with which transportation facilities are restored in support of massive military shipments, and to resolve other rear services support problems.

TS 788023
Copy # 10




The necessity of updating general views on a number of problems of military art was brought to light. This relates primarily to practical measures for covering state borders and repulsing an enemy invasion; to planning the methods of conducting an air operation in the theater of military operations in order to gain air superiority; to organizing radioelectronic warfare for the purpose of disrupting and putting out of action troop and weapon control systems; to organizing effective reconnaissance in the theater of military operations; and so forth.

Improvement of the operational training of commanders and staffs. The experience of the exercise showed a clear need for increased attention to the practical working out of problems involving the combat employment of conventional weapons in operations. This applies in particular to the methodology of operational-tactical calculations for the destruction by fire of the enemy with artillery and aviation in order to inflict maximum losses on him, and also to the use of antitank means; to deepening knowledge concerning the transition of rocket troops and delivery aircraft to the highest levels of readiness to deliver the first nuclear strike; to the more thorough organization of the cooperation of ground troops with aviation, with the forces and means of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries, and with naval forces when conducting an amphibious landing operation.

From the preliminary analysis of the experience of Exercise "ZAPAD-77", there arises the important conclusion that it is necessary to concentrate our combined efforts on a profound study and theoretical substantiation of the questions that have been raised and on working out unified views and measures for their practical resolution.

TS 788023
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~



-13-

The allied armies that participated in the exercise have done much work to synthesize its results and have outlined specific ways of resolving the problems brought to light.

Respected Comrade Minister! Having informed you of the results of Exercise "ZAPAD-77", I express the hope that the questions raised will be carefully studied, that they will obtain further theoretical substantiation and practical resolution, and that they will be given due consideration in the training of the troops allocated to the complement of the Combined Armed Forces.

With deep respect,

V. KULIKOV
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

TS 788023

Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~